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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines Rawls’ duty of assistance (DOA). It argues that some of the major 
criticisms that have been levelled against the DOA are based on a mischaracterisation of 
Rawls’ position in LP. The paper also argues that what many of Rawls’ critics have failed to 
appreciate is not how little Rawls’ DOA asks well-ordered peoples to do, but rather how 
much. The paper suggest that, taken at face value, the latter is in fact is too much to ask 
and much more than we can realistically achieve or allow ourselves to attempt. Finally, the 
paper provides a sketch of how to reconceptualise the DOA in a way that both addresses 
the aforementioned objection and, at the same time, is compatible with LP’s general 
framework.  
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It is fair to say that Rawls’ treatment of international distributive 
obligations in The Law of Peoples (1999 – hereafter LP) did not receive a 
warm welcome by the liberal philosophical community. Many were baffled by 
Rawls’ dubious empirical generalizations concerning the wealth of nations and 
the sources of their prosperity (Beitz, 2000). Others were disappointed by the 
idea that distributive justice at the international level was to be 
reconceptualised as a duty of assistance (hereafter DOA) to burdened societies 
(Pogge, 2004). Others still argued that if justice is the first virtue of social, 
political and economic institutions, and since there are many such institutions 
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at the international level, then surely we should apply our ideas concerning 
distributive justice beyond the state (Buchanan, 2000). 1 
A general feature of the aforementioned reactions is the idea that LP 
provides an undemanding and underwhelming characterisation of our 
international obligations. It does not provide a rich enough sense of the 
international or global obligations of justice that peoples have toward each 
other; the DOA is not a duty of justice but should be one;2 the DOA attributes 
to the poor responsibility for their own fate, not, as it should, the world order; 
the DOA does not cater to the many unjust inequalities of wealth and power 
that plague the global economy. The default option, if one wishes to criticize 
Rawls, seems to be that he is not asking his theory to do as much as it should. 
More than finding these allegations unconvincing, I find them strikingly off 
the mark: the real weakness of Rawls’ account of our international duties is 
that it asks those who have to perform them to do too much not too little.  
The nature of this problem can be grasped if we look at LP from a slightly 
‘higher’ vantage point. Rawls’ critics basically complain that he often depicts a 
world in which all peoples are responsible for their choices and the outcomes 
of such choices. Rawls also maintains that some societies, given their social 
and political culture, are unable to become responsible for their fates. This 
might suggest a relatively dubious picture, one in which the poor are poor 
because of their ill-judgment, and the rich are only there to assist them, not to 
give them what they are owed. But this is simply a mistaken interpretation of 
Rawls’ international theory. Perhaps the most fatal problem with this type of 
view is that it fails to make a simple connection. If the sources of how a society 
fares are domestic social and political institutions, and if we have a duty to 
 
1 While the latter has been the predominant critical reaction for a long time, it is also fair to 
say that more sympathetic responses have appeared in the literature. Some have argued that 
Rawls’ ideas have to be interpreted at the appropriate level of abstraction: they concern ideal 
theory, not the world as we see it (Reidy, 2004; idem., 2007; Freeman, 2007). Others have 
insisted that, if we understand how peoples and their interests are constructed by Rawls in LP, 
then, it becomes clear why wealth is not a priority for them (Wenar, 2006; 2004). 
2 This issue in particular is less conceptually clear that some have assumed. In general there 
is a tendency to believe that the main difference between justice and assistance is the degree to 
which a principle is binding. Given that the DOA is part of the eight principles of LP and that 
all principles are equally binding, the application of the ‘degree of bindingness’ distinction is 
not particularly helpful. It could also be argued that since the eight principles themselves are a 
conception of justice for the Society of Peoples, then as the DOA is one of these principles it 
must, ipso facto, be a principle of justice. That is true but it does not clarify the distinction 
between a principle of justice and a principle of assistance. Perhaps the best conceptual 
distinction is the one provided by Valentini (2011a) claiming that principles of assistance, 
among other things, already presuppose a system of just entitlements. That is probably true for 
LP, as it is based on the prior legitimacy of well-ordered peoples and their control over the 
territories and natural resources that they occupy.     
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help all societies to become well-ordered and responsible for their choices (as 
Rawls thinks we have), then, surely, what we have a duty to do is quite 
extraordinary: we have a duty to change, or vigorously shape, the social and 
political institutions of all societies burdened by unfavourable conditions. Very 
few cosmopolitan proposals ask so much of those who are lucky enough to live 
in a well-ordered society, and there are good reasons to believe that it would 
mean, in fact, asking too much.  
This is, in my view, the most important problem the DOA has to face. 
However, the fact that such problem exists does not mean that no sympathetic 
solution is available within the Rawlsian framework. In fact, I believe there is 
such a solution, although it requires a partial reframing of the way in which we 
conceive of the DOA. It calls for greater concentration on human rights and a 
more incentive-based solution to the problem of developing well-ordered 
institutions. The aim of this essay is thus threefold: a) to show that the 
traditional critiques of Rawls’ DOA are unsound; b) to expose the real 
weaknesses of Rawls’ approach; and finally, c) to provide a sympathetic 
reconstruction that addresses those weaknesses in a way that is broadly 
compatible with the constraints of the overall framework provided by Rawls’ 
international theory. The structure of the essay is as follows. I rehearse Rawls 
understanding of the DOA, its meaning, context and purpose, in section I. 
This will serve as a background to the rest of paper. In section II I examine 
some of the main critical arguments against Rawls’ DOA, and find them 
wanting. In section III I explain what is in my view the real and relatively 
unexplored challenge posed by the DOA, and in section IV, I sketch what I 
take to be a reasonable solution.3     
I. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (OR LACK THEREOF) IN LP 
 
In LP, just as in A Theory of Justice (1971), there is a crucial distinction 
between what Rawls calls ideal and nonideal theory. For Rawls, ideal theory 
 
3 I will not take up in any detail the issue of what justifies the DOA, i.e. its presence among the 
eight principles of LP. The debate concerning this issue has been recently developed by, Reidy 
(2007), Armstrong (2009) and Williams (2011). In general the literature seems to recognize that the 
DOA is the result of an assurance problem based on the possibility that a well-ordered people might 
become a burdened society through no fault of its own (for example, as the result of a natural 
catastrophe). Of course, as Williams rightly notes, this would be a less than satisfactory explanation 
for those societies that have always been burdened. In contrast, Reidy’s reply to this worry seems to 
consist in denying that we can empirically attribute full responsibility to a people for being 
burdened given the complexity of historical circumstances in the nonideal world that would pre-
exist the establishment of a just law of peoples (for example, colonialism and wars of conquest shift 
responsibilities, but how much, and for how long? And so on). 
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assumes that there is: a) full compliance with the normative principles that 
regulate the domain under consideration; and b) favourable conditions for the 
fulfilment of the obligations that are given by the relevant normative 
principles. In LP, the DOA is ‘triggered’ when the second assumption that 
characterises ideal theory breaks down.4 On the other hand, in Justice as 
Fairness, principles of distributive justice operate in ideal theory, that is, when 
both favourable conditions and full compliance obtain. These definitional 
differences underscore something more substantive: distributive principles 
should not be conceived of as forms of redress for existing circumstances in 
the world as we see it, but operate in the world as it should be.  
As I have just mentioned, in LP Rawls suggest that the DOA is triggered 
when we cannot assume favourable conditions for the development of well-
ordered institutions (LP: 101). In order to fully capture the DOA’s meaning, 
the parallel with the first case of nonideal theory, non-compliance, is 
instructive. According to Rawls, ‘certain regimes refuse to comply with a 
reasonable Law of Peoples; these regimes think a sufficient reason to engage in 
war is that war advances, or might advance, the regime’s rational (not 
reasonable) interests’ (LP: 90). Rawls calls these regimes ‘outlaw states’. Two 
issues are of importance: why such regimes are unwilling to respect the 
principles of LP, and what the goal of LP is in sanctioning their behaviour. For 
Rawls, the origin of the foreign policy behaviour of a people is strictly 
domestic. Rawls’ LP goes ‘from the inside out’, so to speak. Thus, in Rawls’ 
eyes the best way of understanding and explaining the problem posed by 
outlaw states is to examine their internal political life and see that ‘their fault 
[lies] in their political traditions and institutions of law, property and class 
structure, with their sustaining religious and moral beliefs and underlying 
culture. It is these things that shape a society’s political will; and they are the 
elements that must change before a society can support a reasonable Law of 
Peoples’ (LP: 106). On the other hand, the goal of LP, when dealing with non-
compliance, is simply to make the world a place in which ‘all peoples accept 
and follow the (ideal of the) law of Peoples’ (LP: 89). 
These two elements of nonideal theory – its sources, and what we should do 
about it – are accordingly shifted in the case of unfavourable conditions. 
 
4 Note that there is a distinction to be made between what we can call ‘general’ and ‘local’ 
nonideal circumstances. The idea of ‘unfavourable conditions’ can be applied, in other words, 
to the Society of Peoples at large, or to burdened societies individually. The first case would be 
a case of general nonideal theory while the second is a case of local nonideal theory. Rawls 
directly takes up the issue of local nonideal theory since if the Society of Peoples had to deal 
with unfavourable conditions for all its members it would be harder to imagine any principle of 
assistance towards burdened societies: the DOA presupposes some form of Society of Peoples 
is already functioning. Of course this does not mean that in the real world we are not in fact 
facing some form of general nonideal scenario.  
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According to Rawls, ‘[b]urdened societies, while they are not expansive or 
aggressive, lack the political cultural traditions, the human capital and know-
how, and often, the material and technological resources to be well-ordered’ 
(LP: 106). Just as in the first case of nonideal theory, ‘[t]he long-term goal of 
(relatively) well-ordered societies should be to bring burdened societies, like 
outlaw states, into the Society of Peoples’ (LP: 106). But as Rawls tells us, the 
fact that well-ordered peoples have a duty of assistance does not entail that the 
best way to carry out such duty is to establish principles of distributive justice. 
Such principles, in Rawls’ view, do not have a definite cut-off point (LP: 106). 
The DOA, instead, is expressly thought of as a response to a concrete 
problem, namely to allow burdened societies to comply with a reasonable law 
of peoples. Hence, once such objective is achieved, the DOA is fulfilled. 
A further feature of the DOA (one that is often overlooked) that should be 
highlighted is that there is no reason to believe that ‘burdened societies = poor 
societies’. Rawls’ classification of peoples is always political in nature and 
depends on their internal structure and their foreign policy, not on their level 
of affluence. The same holds for well-ordered peoples: liberal and decent 
peoples are not defined or understood by their aggregate or per-capita income 
and wealth, but by the nature of their institutions. The DOA is not a duty to 
assist the poor (although it might contingently do so); it is a duty to assist those 
societies that are incapable of being well-ordered, either as a liberal or decent 
people, and which consequently might be unable (given unfavourable 
conditions) to follow the precepts of a reasonable Law of Peoples.  
The aim or goal of the DOA is even more clearly stated by Rawls when he 
contrasts his view with what he calls cosmopolitan views. According to Rawls 
the “final political end of society is to become fully just and stable for the right 
reasons. Once that end is reached, the Law of Peoples prescribes no further 
target such as, for example, to raise the standard of living beyond what is 
necessary to sustain those institutions” (LP: 119). LP is not primarily 
concerned with the material well-being of individuals but with the justice of 
the societies of which they are members.5 Conceptually, the DOA is not a 
principle to improve the lot of those who fare worst at the global level 
(although, contingently, it might achieve that end); it is a principle that aims at 
guaranteeing to all persons that they will live in a well-ordered political 
community, and to all political communities that the world in which they 
interact will be one where all adopt a reasonable Law of Peoples.     
Rawls also discusses some of the cosmopolitan alternatives to his view in 
paragraphs 16.2 and 16.3 (LP: 115–20). Rawls contrasts his LP with Beitz’s two 
 
5 Needless to say, the justice of society deeply affects how individual ‘fare’. However, there is 
no reason to believe that how individuals fare can be reduced to their material well-being.  
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principles of global justice – a global principle concerning the redistribution of 
natural resources, and a global distributive principle modelled on the 
difference principle (LP: 116–17) – and with Pogge’s General Resource 
Dividend (GRD, see LP: 119). As a reply to Beitz’s principle concerning the 
distribution of the benefits derived from natural resources Rawls reiterates his 
general idea of the sources of development (both political and economic) by 
stating that ‘the crucial element in how a country fares is its political culture 
and … not the level of its resources’ (LP: 119). According to Rawls, then, the 
unequal distribution of natural resources has no clear bearing on his 
discussion of mutual obligations between peoples. As a reply to Pogge’s 
principle Rawls basically maintains that if it has a target – that is, if it is linked 
with the satisfaction of persons’ basic needs and human rights – then the 
difference between the GRD and the DOA is marginal. There might be 
disagreement on how to set the target but, as Rawls states, ‘surely there is a 
point at which a people’s basic needs (estimated in primary goods) are fulfilled 
and a people can stand on its own’ (LP: 119).  
Rawls’ reply to Beitz’s second principle of global distributive justice 
(something akin to a globalised version of the difference principle) is much 
more controversial. Rawls states that Beitz’s principle might seem an attractive 
solution provided we take as a reference the world as we see it, plagued as it is 
by injustice, destitution, and conflict. However, as was made clear early on, 
principles of distributive justice, for Rawls, are meant to apply in ideal theory. 
Therefore for Rawls the real question is whether, in LP, once all peoples are 
well-ordered and there are no more burdened societies, we can still look 
favourably on the consequences of applying a principle of global distributive 
justice between peoples. In Rawls’ eyes, this situation ‘gives what we 
would…regard as unacceptable results’ (LP: 117). 
Why so? As we have seen, Rawls seems to take for granted that the sources 
of economic and political development are domestic. In stating his reply to 
Beitz’s second global distributive principle Rawls also lays out what in his view 
follows from that. Rawls proposes two comparisons. The first is between a 
society that decides to industrialize and increase its real rate of savings, while 
the second decides to opt for a more leisurely and pastoral way of life. In the 
second comparison, two societies with equal (and adequate) protection for 
women’s rights decide to opt for different population growth policies. In both 
cases, Rawls assumes that the societies he mentions are either liberal or well-
ordered, and that the relevant starting positions are equal. In both cases, ex 
hypothesi, levels of wealth will vary between the two societies compared. 
However, according to Rawls it would be unfair not to hold peoples with 
liberal or decent basic structures responsible for their collective choices. And 
yet, this is exactly what would be implied by a global distributive principle 
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without a target. In Rawls’ view, Beitz’s second principle is unacceptable 
because it fails to make room for peoples’ responsibility for their level of well-
being once we can grant that their institutions are either liberal or decent.        
 
 
II. DEBATING THE DOA 
 
In what follows I examine two of the most prominent arguments put 
forward by Rawls’ critics. My provisional conclusion is that they do not really 
address the core of LP’s structure. The critics assume that Rawls is imagining 
a ‘vanished Westphalian order’ (Buchanan, 2000), but Rawls’ argument should 
be placed at the level of ideal theory, not the world as we see it (see also Reidy, 
2004; idem., 2007; Freeman, 2007). Rawls’ critics assume that he entertains the 
implausible empirical thesis that the sources of economic growth and 
domestic are wholly domestic. Yet Rawls is ambivalent about such argument, 
and furthermore, given the purpose of the DOA, he simply does not need to 
claim as much: what is crucial is the more modest conviction that initial 
endowments of economic resources are not important to become well-ordered.  
 
II.1 Two (Alleged) Empirical Assumptions 
Perhaps the most common form of critical response to Rawls’ treatment of 
distributive justice is that the empirical assumptions needed to support his 
account in LP are far from solid (see Buchanan, 2000). Two (alleged) empirical 
assumptions seem to stand out in Rawls’ account. The first concerns the way 
in which we explain a people’s aggregate wealth and level of development. As 
we have seen above, Rawls seems to rely on the idea that the latter can be 
almost entirely explained by domestic institutional factors. The second 
empirical assumption upon which Rawls’ theory is (allegedly) based, and one 
that seems to be in line with the first, is that peoples are relatively in control of 
their economic fate and can thus be considered responsible for how they fare. 
According to Allen Buchanan, this amounts to stating that Rawls considers 
peoples to be both “economically self-sufficient and distributionally 
autonomous” (2000: 701). Rawls thus seems to project a vision of the world in 
which all peoples are responsible for their present condition and are fully in 
control of their futures. Taken at face value these are quite extraordinary 
claims. Firstly, there is still no consensus among economists and social 
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scientists on which are the real causes of economic growth and development 
(see Rodrik, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 45ff). Secondly, as many 
have pointed out, the relative autonomy of peoples in the world as we see it 
sounds more like a cruel joke than a plausible reconstruction of existing 
international economic integration (see Pogge, 2006).   
 
II.2 The Relevance of Ideal Theory 
These arguments are not persuasive. First, they seem not to appreciate the 
shift between different domains of enquiry in Rawls’ theory. Rawls’ views 
concerning the appropriateness of distributive justice in LP are not premised 
on an empirical argument. In order to see why, we need to place the argument 
in its correct context. Rawls is arguing against principles of distributive justice 
between peoples. One of the main problems he identifies is that these 
principles of justice work in ideal theory and thus have no clear target or cut-
off point. Within the bounds of ideal theory, we imagine all relevant subjects 
to be compliant with LP and we assume that favourable conditions obtain; 
therefore, empirical matters will not settle the question in hand. Why so? 
Because the world as we see it is emphatically not the one that the ideal theory 
of LP imagines, and there is no real conclusion we can draw from analyzing 
existing practices of international economic integration (see Freeman, 2007: 
261ff). For example, when Rawls mentions the idea that peoples can be 
considered responsible for some of the collective choices they make, he is not 
maintaining that existing political communities will be able to fully control 
their fate. Rather, he is simply conjecturing that in the ideal theory of LP, 
where all peoples are by definition either liberal or decent, and where all 
peoples follow the precepts of LP, they could be considered as responsible for 
their choices (see Brown, 2002).  
Some might wish to maintain that, even if we grant the fact that Rawls’ 
account is working within the bounds of ideal theory, he still fails to provide 
any good reason for designing the ideal theory of LP the way he does (see the 
excellent discussion in Valentini, 2011: 85ff). By imagining an ideal theory in 
which (existing) international interdependence does not really have a role, 
Rawls is in fact assuming away the very nature of the problem that has 
generated the discussion, and is not providing a theory that is action-guiding 
in any relevant sense (Valentini, 2011: 86). But Rawls’ theory, at least implicitly, 
does provide such type of guidance. The international order, Rawls maintains, 
could be just if it was populated by just and decent societies. So, when asked 
what to do in order to change the many injustices that plague the international 
arena, we do have a Rawlsian answer: we start at home, and hope that change 
can go from the inside outwards. As Rawls says, and it is hard not to agree, 
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‘[a]ny hope we have of reaching a realistic utopia rests on there being 
reasonable liberal constitutional (and decent) regimes sufficiently established 
and effective to yield a viable Society of Peoples’ (LP: 29–30).  
As some have pointed out, Rawls’ strategy could be undermined if we 
thought that the problems of domestic and international justice were 
inextricably intertwined (Valentini, 2011: 88). But the latter idea is only 
initially plausible. When we look at the world as it is, the two problems are 
clearly linked; but if we imagine a world in which all political communities 
were well-ordered in Rawls’ sense, then it would be less than clear that 
achieving international justice with a ‘from inside to outside’ strategy would be 
impossible. To illustrate, think of the following examples. If in all major 
markets companies were prevented from buying goods tainted by child labour, 
child labour would greatly diminish at the global level. If all major market 
participants refrained from buying, again as a matter of public policy, natural 
resources from murderous regimes, then the incentives provided to those 
regimes to violently gain power would be undermined (see Wenar, 2008). If all 
major economies and all major international economic organizations refused 
to lend to oppressive dictators, then the incentives to create and accumulate 
‘odious debt’ would clearly vanish. Yet, it seems clear that well-ordered 
societies would be the type of societies that could aspire to have these public 
policies, or perhaps even be required to have them – if not because of how 
Rawls explicitly designs them, then because of what we can infer given the 
account Rawls gives us of their basic structures and of the virtues of their 
citizens.       
 
 
II.3 The Irrelevance of Initial Endowments 
It is also (partially) misguided to identify Rawls’ ‘domestic factors’ 
argument as an argument concerning economic growth (strictly speaking). I 
say ‘partially’ because Rawls is probably using two different theses concerning 
the relationship between domestic institutions and how a country ‘fares’. What 
I shall call the strong thesis states that: economic growth and a country’s level 
of development are fully determined by the shape of domestic institutions. 
What I shall call the weak thesis states that: the initial economic endowments 
are irrelevant to a society’s prospects of becoming well-ordered. Compounding 
Rawls’ ambiguity between these two theses there is also the distinction 
between ideal and nonideal theory; so we have:  
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TABLE 1: Different Interpretations of the DOA 
 Strong Thesis (A1) Weak Thesis (A2) 
Ideal Theory 
(B1) 
In a world where most 
societies followed LP, 
economic growth 
would be 
endogenously 
determined. 
In a world where most 
societies followed LP, 
initial endowments 
would be irrelevant to 
prospects of becoming 
well-ordered. 
Nonideal 
Theory (B2) 
In the world as we see 
it, economic growth is 
fully explained 
endogenously. 
In the world as we see 
it, initial economic 
endowments are 
irrelevant to becoming 
well-ordered. 
 
  
 
In what follows I will go through the four different combinations offered by 
Table 1. I will claim that the most charitable interpretation of Rawls’ account 
portrays him as committed to what I call the weak thesis in ideal theory (A2-
B1).  
Let me start with A1-B1 (strong thesis in nonideal theory) – what I take to 
be the least plausible interpretation of LP. When, for example, Pogge speaks of 
‘explanatory nationalism’ (see Pogge, 2002) it is precisely that thesis that he is 
attacking. But, as we have seen, Rawls’ enquiry is meant to take place in ideal 
theory, so it seems illegitimate to think that, according to Rawls, in the world 
as we see it, all societies are fully responsible for their economic fate. What 
about A2-B2 (weak thesis in nonideal theory)? From an empirical point of 
view, the question is hotly debated. Some claim that geography is a central 
explanatory feature of a people’s level of economic development. Others point 
out that several countries with relatively low levels of initial economic and 
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natural endowments have managed to achieve spectacular levels of economic 
growth over extend periods of time (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012 for 
extensive discussions of different alternatives). What is relevant for the 
purposes of our argument, however, is that the debate is orthogonal to the 
concerns discussed by LP: what matters for the DOA is institutional 
development not per capita or aggregate wealth.     
Rawls sometimes ‘flirts’ with A1-B1 (strong thesis in ideal theory). 
Discussing the second guideline of the DOA he states that ‘the causes of the 
wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture’ (LP: 108), 
while when discussing equality among peoples he mentions that a peoples 
which develops feelings of inferiority given its lack of wealth can, ‘[i]f it is not 
satisfied’, take further action and ‘continue to increase savings, or, if that is not 
feasible, borrow from other members of the Society of Peoples’ (LP: 114). In 
both cases Rawls seems to be genuinely committed to the idea that, at least in 
ideal theory, the origins of a people’s wealth are purely domestic. But the latter 
idea seems irrelevant to the main point Rawls wants to make. The target or 
aim of LP is that all societies are well-ordered, not rich, so there is no purpose 
in insisting that the sources of economic wealth are purely domestic (even in 
an ideal theory scenario). 
In the same way, when Rawls presents his two comparisons between peoples 
that make different choices and become differently well off, he might be seen 
to imply that it is enough for a people to get wealthier just to change a given 
element of its public institutions (either its economic policy or its population 
policy). Once again, we have to pay attention to what Rawls is arguing. Rawls’ 
purpose in presenting the two comparisons is to show that a principle of global 
distributive justice would be unacceptable. To do this, he imagines what are, 
ex hypothesis, two cases in which levels of wealth can be traced back to 
changes in public institutions (see also Freeman, 2007: 291). The point is not 
that, whatever else might affect a people’s circumstances, the only factor that 
would determine its level of wealth is, for instance, its real rate of savings. 
Rather, the point is that, all other things being equal, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that increasing one’s real rate of savings will affect economic growth. 
In fact it is precisely in order to deny that this type of example is possible that 
one would have to be committed to the diametrically opposed thesis to the one 
(wrongly) attributed to Rawls. Or, in other words, one would have to commit 
to the thesis that it is impossible to even imagine a controlled scenario in 
which a domestic factor for which a people can be considered responsible is 
capable of producing changes in the level of its aggregate wealth. 
Is there any support for the weak thesis in ideal theory (A2-B1), then? If the 
centrality of economic growth for LP can be partially challenged by attending 
to its aims, the weak thesis can be supported by the theorists Rawls addresses. 
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For instance, when discussing Beitz’s argument concerning the redistribution 
of natural resources in a theory of global distributive justice, Rawls states that, 
‘because, as I have said, the crucial element in how a country fares is its 
political culture … and not the level of its resources, the arbitrariness of the 
distribution of natural resources causes no difficulty’ (LP: 117). If we interpret 
‘how a country fares’ to signify ‘its prospect of becoming well-ordered’ then 
Rawls seems to endorse precisely the weaker thesis. And given that Rawls’ 
analysis is carried out mainly at the level of ideal theory, then Rawls is 
probably better portrayed as endorsing the ideal-theory version of the weak 
thesis. Whether or not this reflects Rawls’ intentions is, in my view, beside the 
point. LP simply does not ‘need’ more than the ideal-theory version of the 
weak thesis.  
Is the ideal-theory version of the weak thesis plausible? Of course, it is not 
uncontroversial, but it is far from unrealistic. As we have seen, when Rawls is 
outlining the idea that peoples will ‘fare’ according to their political cultures 
and the shape of their domestic institutions he is not simply concerned with 
their level of affluence. Rather, Rawls is suggesting that a society’s political 
culture is crucial to understand whether it will manage to become well-
ordered. This is unsurprising given that being well-ordered is mainly a 
political, not an economic, criterion. Being well-ordered is a feature of the 
basic structure of a society, and not of the per-capita incomes of persons. But, 
then, what else could be responsible for the shape of a society’s basic structure 
than its social and political institutions and the political virtues of its citizenry? 
In a nonideal theory scenario we can imagine innumerable instances of wars 
of aggression and colonization that might shift this type of responsibility from 
‘inside’ to ‘outside’. But, Rawls’ argument is carried out at the level of ideal 
theory. And, in ideal theory, a country’s political culture and the virtues of its 
citizens (not its initial set of economic endowments) can be considered as 
strong predictors of a country’s prospects to become well-ordered.      
 
        
III. THE REAL PROBLEM WITH THE DOA 
 
In the previous section I analysed two of the main criticisms that have been 
levelled towards the DOA, and found both unpersuasive. However this is not 
to say that the DOA (at least if interpreted in the ways I will survey in this 
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section) is in fact a plausible solution to the problem Rawls wants to address.6 
In what follows, I will begin by outlining an important omission in the critical 
literature on the DOA. If Rawls is really committed to the idea that the 
determinants of how a country fares are domestic, then it is precisely those 
domestic factors that the DOA will have to address. This is not an abdication 
of responsibility but rather an extraordinary commitment on the part of well-
ordered societies. Such commitment is so important that, in fact, it might be 
pictured as being problematic both from a practical and moral point of view. 
The section ends by discussing an objection to my critique of the DOA.  
 
III.1 The (real) omission 
In general, Rawls’ critics come from the so-called (in the literature on global 
justice) cosmopolitan camp. The underlying assumption of their critical 
attention is that the DOA is simply ‘not enough’ to deal with the problems 
Rawls wants to address, or that it completely obliterates a great variety of real-
world circumstances that should be normatively relevant for an account of 
international ethics. It is not surprising, then, that very few have considered 
the opposite problem. The DOA is not something less demanding that we 
settle for because we want to realistically address the world as we see it. The 
DOA is in fact exceedingly demanding as a form of international obligation 
(see Armstrong, 2009; Williams, 2011). What so many of Rawls’ critics have 
failed to appreciate is how much Rawls seems to be asking decent and liberal 
societies to do for the sake of burdened societies, not how little.   
To get a better grasp of the aforementioned problem it is useful to recall the 
kind of guidelines Rawls provides to implement the DOA. The first is that we 
should refrain from considering a well-ordered society as necessarily rich one. 
In turn, according to Rawls, this brings out the similarity between the DOA 
 
6 Here there are two issues we should try, as far as possible, to disentangle. The first is a 
substantive problem: What is a plausible solution to the case of burdened societies? The second 
is an interpretive problem: What is Rawls’ preferred solution to the problem of burdened 
societies? In this section I present what I take to be two implausible solutions to the problem of 
burdened societies: a) one based on the idea of full-blown institution-building abroad, and b) 
one based on the simple provision of advice. Is Rawls committed to either of the two 
(implausible) solutions? As I say in section IV below, Rawls’ text is ambiguous, and it seems 
that both interpretations can rely on some textual support. I present an alternative view, based 
on human rights, and claim that my preferred substantive solution is compatible with Rawls’ 
overall architecture in LP. If we were to apply the standard of interpretive charity, perhaps, one 
could claim that since the solution I propose is taken to be superior, and since it is compatible 
with the main elements of the overall text, then it should be taken to be Rawls’ view. I want to 
leave this option open, but my main goal is to present, in section III, two understandings of the 
DOA that I see as implausible, and then in section IV one that I find more attractive. As I 
repeat in section IV, I take these to be substantive rather than interpretive claims. 
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and the principle of just savings in TJ: both stress how wealth is not something 
that is required to become well-ordered. If the final aim we set ourselves is to 
imagine a world in which all persons can live under liberal or decent 
institutions, the idea of permanently increasing or maximizing wealth is 
superfluous as wealth is not really what determines a society’s prospect of 
becoming a full member of the Society of Peoples (LP: 106–7). The second 
guideline for thinking about the DOA is that, as we have seen above, the 
political culture of a burdened society is all-important. As Rawls says, ‘the 
crucial elements that make the difference are the political culture, the political 
virtues, and civic society of the country, its members’ probity and 
industriousness, their capacity for innovation, and much else’ (LP: 108). The 
third guideline that Rawls provides is the target of the DOA. The DOA is not 
aimed at making burdened societies wealthier: rather, its ultimate aim is to 
allow them to become well-ordered. The target, in other words, is to imagine a 
world exclusively populated by well-ordered societies and in which all are able 
and willing to comply with a reasonable law of peoples.   
What is striking about the discussion of Rawls’ DOA is how little Rawls’ 
critics have picked-up on how demanding its goals seem to be. This is even 
more striking because so many have criticized, as we have seen in section II, 
precisely the preconditions of Rawls’ analysis that provide the basis for 
understanding the DOA’s demandingness. According to his critics Rawls’ 
analysis is fallaciously based on the rather precarious idea that, in the world as 
we see it, the sources of economic wealth and development are purely 
domestic. And, in general, Rawls’ move was portrayed as a form of abdication 
from responsibility (see Pogge, 2002): it is not the world order that inflicts the 
scourge of poverty on some of its members, rather, it is the poor’s fault if their 
condition does not improve. Now, I believe that that I have already provided 
(see section II) good reasons to question the idea that we can attribute the 
latter thesis to LP. LP works at the level of ideal theory, and its stance on 
economic development is plausibly depicted as the more modest idea that, in a 
society of well-ordered peoples, initial economic endowments are irrelevant to 
a society’s prospects of becoming well-ordered. What is nonetheless interesting 
is that it is precisely by adopting the critical stance that many have expressed 
towards LP that its implications should give us pause.  
In other words, and leaving aside the correctness of their arguments, Rawls’ 
critics seem unaware of the type of criticisms they make signals about the 
nature of the DOA. If one really believes that the sources of economic 
development and growth are purely to be found in social and political 
institutions at the domestic level, and if one is also committed to the idea that 
there is a duty to help all societies to become well-ordered, then it is precisely 
those social and political institutions that one will have to change (or at least 
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strongly shape) in order to address the problem. This is far from an abdication 
of responsibility; in fact it requires an assumption of responsibility that is 
much greater than most cosmopolitans would be prepared to advocate (see 
Armstrong, 2009). It entails the idea that in a world where many of its 
inhabitants do not live within the bounds of a well-ordered society, the duty of 
those who are fortunate enough to live in one is to embark upon collective 
action for widespread institutional reform across continents. Surely, this is no 
small feat.  
 
III.2 Resources, information and paternalism 
The latter observations, in turn, expose three main problems with the 
DOA. First, the DOA might turn out to be too demanding from a material 
point of view. Second, the DOA seems to require a set of epistemic attributes 
and capacities that we presently lack. Third, even assuming that the first and 
second problems can be solved, the DOA seems to require what many would 
consider to be an unhealthy dose of intrusion in the institutional development 
of a political society.   
Let’s start with the first problem. Conceptually speaking, there seems to be 
no guarantee that putting the DOA into practice is even remotely possible. In 
the ideal theory of LP we have no information concerning how resources are 
distributed between well-ordered peoples and burdened societies. 
Furthermore, as we have stated on a number of occasions, there is no reason 
to believe that well-ordered societies will be rich. In the same way, in LP, 
Rawls explicitly argues that resources are not really what should matter for a 
political community. In fact, he even conjectures that a Millian steady state of 
zero growth would be an ideal solution to avoid the development of political 
cultures based on materialistic values and prey to capitalistic ideals. These 
remarks should alert us to the type of ideal scenario that Rawls is imagining: a 
world in which well-ordered peoples do not really care about wealth, and 
where its accumulation would not, as a result, be a primary policy objective. 
This picture might not be a realistic one (at least not looking at our current 
world), but what is important about it is that it reinforces the suspicion that we 
have no reason to believe that well-ordered societies could, in principle, be 
able to help the citizens of burdened ones (at least if, as I claim, helping them 
requires transforming their institutions). Of course, Rawls could comment that 
helping burdened societies is not, per se, about transferring resources; but 
while resources are not sufficient, they seem nonetheless necessary. We should 
not confuse: a) the resources that are necessary to a people to become well-
ordered; and b) the resources that are necessary to change the political culture 
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of a burdened society. While we can conjecture, with Rawls, that (a) does not 
require a great amount of resources, there is no reason to believe that (b) will 
not be much more costly.  
Consider, second, the informational requirements connected to the DOA. 
Not only is (b) likely to involve significant amounts of resources, it also might 
require the ability to master significant amounts of information: a capacity we 
might not really possess (see Fukuyama, 2006). In fact, as recent historical 
experience tells us, and as Rawls himself admits, ‘there is no recipe, certainly 
no easy recipe, for well-ordered peoples to help a burdened society to change 
its political and social culture’ (LP: 108; see also Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012; Flournoy, 2006). Note how we can relatively easily observe a certain 
connection between a society’s social and political culture and its ability to 
develop well-ordered institutions. On the other hand it is rather more difficult 
to prescribe how certain social and political traits of a burdened society would 
have to change in order for the latter to become well-ordered. For example, we 
can conjecture that relegating women to a position of subjection in society can 
lead to overpopulation and, in turn, underdevelopment and the inability to 
meet the basic needs of persons. But observing the connection between 
women’s rights and overpopulation will not be enough in order to know how 
to reform a social and political culture that attributes a subordinate role to 
women. Political cultures and social structures are not made-up of linear cause 
and effect mechanisms. Their transformation is not something that can be 
achieved by observing and then altering isolated elements.    
Third, consider the morally problematic aspects of the DOA, namely, its 
long-term effects on the moral and political character of a people, and the 
extent to which we should be prepared to accept that the latter are deeply 
shaped by outsiders. The morally problematic aspects of the DOA can be 
grasped if we consider the kind of responsibilities that are clearly attached to 
the idea of, among other things, radically changing the ‘virtues’ of a society’s 
citizenry, its social and political institutions and much else in the process (see 
Williams, 2011: 66, 198). Rawls is fully aware of this problem, as when he 
states: ‘the well-ordered societies giving assistance must not act 
paternalistically, but in measured ways that do not conflict with the final aim 
of assistance: freedom and equality for the formerly burdened societies’ (LP: 
111). Rawls also mentions the idea that well-ordered peoples should not tie 
assistance to the development of liberal institutions. Yet, the latter point can 
only partially defuse the worry that we have raised. Well-ordered peoples can 
say to a burdened society, ‘you do not need to become liberal to receive our 
help’. But they cannot really say ‘you will receive our help and you can choose 
how to develop your institutions the way you see fit’.  
369  Rawls’ Duty of Assistance: a Defense and Re-Ealaboration 
 
Burdened societies are burdened precisely because of the way in which 
their institutions have developed over time. If we believe that such institutions 
should change, then it seems clear that we cannot avoid deciding, at least in 
part, how such social and political institutions are to be designed. Well-ordered 
peoples may not suggest liberal solutions, but they will have to suggest some 
solution. This claim is confirmed by the fact that, in general, exercises of 
institution building abroad often rely on force and do not really cater to local 
ideas of legitimacy (see Pei, Amin and Garz, 2006).7 In the end, the impression 
is that if one undertakes profound institutional reform abroad (eventually 
changing some of the deepest elements of a foreign social and political 
culture), one cannot do so in a way that is purely morally neutral. And this is 
especially the case, given that some burdened societies might not necessarily 
welcome the proposed changes.  
 
 
III.3 The ‘advice’ interpretation 
In this final part of section III I address an important objection to the 
critique of the DOA I have put forward in III.1 and III.2. The objection goes 
as follows: it might indeed be true that the DOA is too demanding, but only, 
and only if, we consider it as a duty to directly alter the political culture of a 
burdened society. Yet, the objection continues, the DOA is not that type of 
duty; it is instead a way of signalling that well-ordered societies are under a 
duty to try to assist those that are burdened to become well-ordered. They 
should not coerce them, nor pressurize them. What they are required to do is 
simply to provide advice and perhaps some form of financial assistance in 
order to put that advice into practice, but nothing more can plausibly be 
required of them. As one passage in LP suggests, Rawls believes that ‘there is 
no easy recipe for helping a burdened society to change its political culture. 
Throwing funds at it is usually undesirable, and the use of force is ruled out by 
the Law of Peoples. But certain kinds of advice may be helpful’ (LP: 110). In 
other words, the DOA does not prescribe anything along the lines of the 
institution-building duty I have examined in the previous few paragraphs, but 
is instead a duty of advice and support. This interpretation would also solve 
the moral problem tied to the deeply intrusive nature of the DOA. If the DOA 
 
7 For example, Pei, Amin and Garz believe that two of the most important lessons to be 
drawn from the American experience with nation-building concern the use of force and the 
relative neglect of local political demands: ‘First the United States must sustain its 
commitments of troops, time, and money despite domestic political opposition. Second, the 
United States should balance the demands for greater legitimacy by political opposition in the 
target country with reconstruction needs’ (2006: 81). 
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is simply constructed as ‘advice’, the decision to follow the advice or not is one 
that burdened societies will be allowed to make for themselves.   
A reply to this objection concedes that this reading of the DOA might make 
it more plausible in terms of what well-ordered societies are required to do; the 
content of the duty, given by ‘advice’ and the ‘possibility of assistance’, would 
indeed be more reasonable. But, crucially, it would also make the DOA 
unworkable. It would become what we can call a futile duty, because its results 
regarding the fate of burdened societies would probably be marginal. 
Burdened societies lack the political culture to become well-ordered: this is the 
crucial distinction between different types of nonideal theory in LP. Some 
societies are unwilling to comply with LP (i.e. outlaw states) but other societies 
are simply unable, and that is what justifies our different attitudes towards 
them. The fact that such societies (that is, burdened ones) are unable to 
comply cannot simply mean that they lack resources to do so. As we have seen 
above, resources might be necessary, but given Rawls’ take on the role of 
initial economic endowments that are required to become well-ordered, they 
are certainly not what is at issue. If we consider the DOA as simply a duty of 
providing advice, such duty would probably be ineffectual in all most relevant 
cases, as the weaker a society’s social and political culture and institutions, the 
less likely it is that simple advice and resources will make a difference.  
Furthermore, perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the advice interpretation 
is that, by reducing the amount of commitment on the part of the Society of 
Peoples, it also leaves the fulfilment of the human rights of burdened societies’ 
citizens to a much greater dose of chance. Given Rawls’ discussion of the DOA 
we have no clear idea about whether human rights are respected in a 
burdened society. If we believe that the duty of the Society of Peoples is only 
one of advice, and if we don’t know if the human rights of a burdened society’s 
citizens are being fulfilled, then LP (in this interpretation) seems to require a 
simple commitment to providing advice in cases where human rights are not 
respected.8 This would have great human costs for LP because, among other 
things, it might imply that the human rights of many who are living in 
burdened societies would not be guaranteed. In fact it would seem to lead to 
the paradoxical conclusion that those who live in burdened societies have even 
less chance of seeing their basic human rights fulfilled compared to those who 
live in outlaw states. Against outlaw states LP prescribes intervention, yet for 
 
8 It should be stressed that ‘not respecting human rights’ is not necessarily to be 
conceptualized as the violation of negative rights. In other words, the argument I am making 
does not presuppose that institutions of burdened societies are necessarily callous. The 
fulfillment of human rights requires substantive positive action and a great deal of institutional 
capacity – precisely the kind of elements that a burdened society may plausibly lack.   
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burdened societies it cannot – in LP the use of force is limited to self-defence 
and specific cases of non-compliance. 
But perhaps I have radically misconstrued the problem. Perhaps burdened 
societies, precisely because they are not ‘unwilling’ but ‘unable’ to comply with 
LP, would gladly accept the help that they receive. I doubt that the latter can 
be a convincing option. Or, at least, it is at the very least not a scenario we can 
take for granted. Conceptually speaking, there is no reason, or at least none is 
provided by Rawls, to imagine that a burdened society would gladly accept the 
revisionist implications of the DOA. There is no reason to assume that 
burdened societies are conscious of their limits and are simply unsuccessfully 
striving to become well-ordered. This is a depiction one can accept only if one 
also assumes that agents who cannot take responsibility for their fate are also 
aware of their limits and try to overcome them. But why should we assume 
that a society lacking the social and political institutions required to become 
well-ordered should have this type of awareness?    
 
IV. SKETCHING A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
 
In the previous section I criticized the DOA for being excessively 
demanding as an international principle of assistance. The DOA seems to be 
caught between two extreme scenarios. On the one hand, if it is interpreted at 
face value as a duty that requires stringent application of its goals, then its 
emphasis on the transformation of the political cultures of burdened societies 
is unsustainable. On the other hand, if the duty is interpreted as one that 
entails ‘advice’ and a modicum of financial support, it seems to be ineffectual 
as it would rely on the idea that burdened societies are unable to become well-
ordered because they are somehow simply ignorant of the processes and ideas 
that could lead them to become so. In this section, I want to offer the initial 
sketch of a potential solution. Briefly stated, my solution is to imagine a two-
speed scenario for the DOA based on the human rights record of a burdened 
society.  
The DOA is often interpreted as a duty of ‘advice’ by its critics, and as an 
institution-building duty by its supporters (see Armstrong, 2009). My 
contention so far has been that neither understanding of the DOA is plausible 
or reasonable. I should stress that the latter is not an interpretive claim, it is a 
substantive one. The goal of this section, then, is not to provide the best 
interpretation of Rawls’ text, but rather, if I am correct, to provide a reframing 
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of the DOA that, while compatible with the overall structure of LP, provides a 
more sustainable solution to the problem of burdened societies.  
The basis for my solution is to partially abandon, at least initially, Rawls’ 
focus on the political culture of burdened societies. I want to maintain that the 
proper target of a stringent duty of assistance in LP, even when it comes to 
burdened societies, is the comparatively less ambitious goal of fulfilling the 
basic human rights of all citizens of burdened societies (see Jones, 2001). It is 
only once this comparatively less demanding duty of assistance is fulfilled that 
LP can concentrate on the idea that a burdened society should become well-
ordered. Conceptualizing the DOA in this way, we can separate Rawls’ view of 
international economic assistance into two different stages. If the human 
rights of the citizens of a burdened society are not fulfilled, the Society of 
Peoples should see its collective duty of assistance towards burdened societies 
as a more stringent one that does not, strictly speaking, require the assent or 
approval of burdened societies themselves. If, on the other hand, citizens of 
burdened societies have their basic human rights fulfilled, then the Society of 
Peoples should interpret the DOA as a less stringent duty of counsel and 
advice and resource availability, coupled with an appropriate system of 
incentives to lead burdened societies to become well-ordered.  
In section III I have highlighted what we can call the problem of resources. 
There I argued that while resources might not be relevant when judging if a 
society is well-ordered (or to its prospects of becoming well-ordered) this does 
not imply that resources will not be necessary to help burdened societies in 
their path to developing well-ordered institutions. I also stated that, given that 
we have no real guarantee that well-ordered peoples would be rich in the ideal 
theory of LP, the material resources needed to fulfil the DOA might be 
lacking; however, concentrating on basic human rights would require fewer 
resources on the part of well-ordered peoples. More precisely, in LP, while 
respecting human rights is one of the necessary conditions that a regime 
should meet in order to be considered well-ordered, they are not sufficient. 
Thus it should be clear that ensuring human rights are protected within 
burdened societies is, at least comparatively, less demanding than ensuring 
burdened societies become well-ordered.  
Furthermore, if well-ordered peoples decide to concentrate on the 
fulfilment of human rights in burdened societies, they would also be able to 
more effectively mobilize resources. The perceived legitimacy of their foreign 
aid would be augmented by the minimal moral goal of preventing severe and 
avoidable destitution and in the meantime would provide a clearer remedy to 
what Rawls calls the ‘problem of affinity’ (paragraph 15.5 is in fact called 
‘Duty of Assistance and Affinity’; LP: 112). According to Rawls, ‘[a] legitimate 
concern about the duty of assistance is whether the motivational support for 
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following it presupposes a degree of affinity among peoples, that is, a sense of 
social cohesion and closeness, that cannot be expected even in a society of 
liberal peoples’ (LP:112), let alone in a society of liberal and decent peoples. A 
comparatively less ambitious DOA aimed (initially) at the protection of the 
human rights of the members of burdened societies would be more effective in 
lessening the social and cultural distance between different peoples given the 
urgency of the human interests it would protect, and it would thus (again, 
comparatively) reduce the problem of affinity highlighted by Rawls.  
Concentrating on human rights would require less information too. The 
focus on human rights effectively side-lines the importance of the political 
culture of burdened societies and instead concentrates on its implications. If 
such implications include the violation of basic human rights, the judgments 
involved will be based on information that is more readily available. For 
instance, it seems more plausible to assess whether the basic needs of a 
population are met rather than if its institutions are freely upheld by the 
citizens, and it is easier to know if the physical integrity of persons is 
guaranteed than to know if all groups in society are properly represented, and 
so on. Not only do human rights violations seem easier to spot, but they also 
seem, at least prima facie, comparatively easier to remedy since they would 
require a smaller degree of institutional reform in order to be put in place.  
Finally, the latter idea is in line with what Rawls himself would prescribe as 
a central component of his strategy to help burdened societies, namely to 
progressively increase the responsiveness of social and political institutions to 
citizens’ requests. Rawls acknowledges that human rights are an important 
first step in that direction (see LP: 108–11). For instance, when explaining the 
DOA’s second guideline, Rawls maintains that ‘[w]hat must be realized is that 
merely dispensing funds will not suffice to rectify basic political and social 
injustices (though money is often essential). But an emphasis on human rights 
may work to change ineffective regimes and the conduct of the rulers who 
have been callous about the well-being of their own people’ (LP: 108–9). This 
would mean that concentrating on human rights could still have a knock-on 
effect for the institutions of burdened societies; insisting on their fulfilment 
could be seen as a milestone towards the more ambitious goal of building well-
ordered institutions.    
Once the protection of human rights is fulfilled in a burdened society, 
though, the task of the Society of Peoples is not over. How can we help 
burdened societies to become not only societies where human rights are 
fulfilled but well-ordered peoples? One of the main problems that the DOA 
faces, as I have argued in section III, is that imposing a system of institutions 
‘from the outside’ is not the kind of task that decent and liberal peoples should 
undertake. At the same time, at least if we accept the framework provided by 
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LP, the goal that all political communities become well-ordered is not one we 
can easily let go of.  A moral and conceptual middle ground can be found, or 
so I suggest, if we conceive of the relationship between burdened societies and 
the Society of Peoples as based the idea of positive incentives to become well-
ordered. Incentives have several advantages. First, and granting that basic 
human rights are fulfilled, they need not be coercive. Second, they would 
allow greater input from the citizens of burdened societies when it comes to 
the specification of the relevant institutional goals. Third, they would make it 
easier to recognize that longer timespans might very well be necessary to 
reform the political culture of a burdened society. Fourth, they might generate 
less resentment from the members of burdened societies as opposed to 
coercion, while at the same time having higher chances of being effective if 
compared to mere advice.             
 
CONCLUSION  
I have examined Rawls’ position on international economic justice. I have 
considered some of the major criticisms that have been levelled against LP. 
The main thrust of such criticisms is that the DOA and Rawls’ understanding 
of international interdependence are unrealistic and that they entail a set of 
obligations that are not robust enough to fully capture the extent of our duties 
of global economic justice. I have rejected these criticisms because, in my view, 
they fail to fully take into consideration the nature of Rawls’ position. 
Furthermore, what many of Rawls’ critics have failed to appreciate is not how 
little Rawls’ LP asks well-ordered peoples to do, but rather how much. The 
DOA can be pictured as a very demanding duty of assistance that asks well-
ordered peoples to transform some of the deepest elements of a society’s 
culture. As I have explained in section III, this is too much to ask and much 
more than we can realistically achieve or allow ourselves to attempt. However, 
this does not mean that the Rawlsian framework cannot contain an alternative 
understanding of the DOA which aims for the same goal, but treads a more 
plausible path to it. I have tried to imagine such a path in section IV.  
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